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Steve Oswald’s paper is an illuminating application of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995) to the rhetoric of conspiracy theories (CTs). The key move Oswald makes is to find in the 
argumentation profile of CTs characteristic strategies and tactics that are adjusted to the biases of 
followers so as to foreground in attention the strengths of CTs and weaknesses of the official 
stories (OTs) and to push into the background the weaknesses of CTs and the strengths of OTs. 
Relevance Theory is particularly well-suited for this kind of epistemic analysis since the central 
focus of the theory is on how people process inferences through the dynamics of cognitive 
environment and linguistic stimulus. In the spirit of encouraging this analysis, I make my 
comments. 
 
2. Warning: Not all conspiracy theories are wrong or irrational 
 
Perhaps this is more of a reminder than a warning since Oswald acknowledges this, and so do 
many of the authors he cites. Some CTs are right, and even when they are wrong, they may still 
be reasonable. Not all followers are nuts. I, like many other humans on this planet who have had 
direct, unmistakable observations, believe in UFOs and find it inconceivable that official 
government denials are part of some kind of cover-up.1 I don’t know what kind of cover-up or 
why governments claim that UFOs are natural or otherwise familiar phenomena. I don’t know 
what the UFO I saw could be. But I know what I saw. And I know that it was not a natural 
phenomenon nor was it a technology that any government admits to possessing. And I’m not 
nuts. I do not ipso facto also believe that there are Lizard People, that the 9/11 attacks were an 
inside job by the Bush Administration, that Vince Foster’s suicide was staged by the Clintons, 
that fluoridation of drinking water is an Illuminati mind-control plot, or that Qatar won the bid 
for the 2022 World Cup soccer tournament by bribing FIFA officials. (Well, maybe I also 
believe that last one.)   
                                                 
1 My own observation occurred while looking at the night sky with a colleague in Tucson, Arizona. I had not even 
realized what I had seen until my colleague asked, “Did you see that?” This occurred the weekend before the March 
26, 1997 mass suicide by the Heaven’s Gate cult who expected to be transported to an extraterrestrial spacecraft 
following the Haley-Bopp Comet and the widely reported Phoenix lights event of March 27, 1997. Both events are 
summarized in Wikipedia.  
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Still, it is really hard to not think of all CTs as “crippled epistemologies,” to not focus on 
dysfunctional patterns of reasoning and rhetoric over the sensible and defensible patterns, to not 
highlight the nut cases. Certainly the peculiar cognitive susceptibilities of some people to fall 
prey to patterns of bad CT rhetoric is important to point out. Oswald is surely right that the 
alignment of rhetorical strategy and cognitive proclivity is an important part of the explanation 
for why some people buy into CTs and why some CTs are so persistent. And there is an urgent 
need to come to terms with this kind of crippled epistemology. Climate change denialists avow 
some patently false beliefs, make some shockingly unreasonable arguments, and the continued 
viability of this sort of rhetoric puts the whole planet at risk.  
 The danger is that the pejorative quality that dominates both the argumentation profile of 
the rhetoric and the personality profile of the follower may reflect not empirical properties but 
self-fulfilling artefact. Any sensible rhetoric or reasonable follower simply doesn’t count as CT 
rhetoric or CT follower; it gets classified as a level-headed cousin. Moreover, an emphasis on 
crippled epistemologies foregrounds the diminished or distorted competencies of the followers 
and advocates and pushes into the background the defective or constrained conditions of the 
situations in which CT rhetoric thrives.  
 
3. Reasonable strategies in unreasonable situations 
 
Both the “just asking questions” and the “scientific inquiry” rhetorical styles that Oswald draws 
from Byford (2011) look very much like reasonable strategies in more limited but still difficult 
rhetorical situations.  
 One of the basic stock issues that an advocate may have to address is, “Why even open 
this controversy for (re)consideration?” Just asking questions is a well adapted style when the OS 
enjoys a strong presumption in its favor and, for various reasons, the OS is taken to be a settled 
matter not requiring defense in the face of sceptical dissent. This would be a particularly difficult 
situation where the OS is promulgated by powerful institutional actors and warranted by the 
authority of institutions with a monopoly on crucial information. Just getting a fair hearing and 
avoiding dismissal out of hand can be a real problem. The refutational preoccupation with 
“errant data” and the failure of OS proponents to answer questions is just the kind of cautious 
opening strategy we might expect from a reasonable skeptic. Of course, if there is uptake then 
the arguments need to progress into a serious and substantive defense of the CT. Continued 
probing of the OS does not provide positive support for the alternative CT.  
 Another basic stock issue that an advocate may have to address is, “Why should I believe 
you and your story?” This is especially so where the OS is backed by credible institutions, the 
CT has little strong factual support, and the standing and motives of CT advocates is itself 
murky. The style of scientific inquiry can help to dispel the doubts behind such a question. Of 
course, ultimately, style cannot substitute for substance. And in the case of “crippled 
epistemologies” it does not, even if some are gulled into accepting fraud and fallacy.  
 But bad arguments do not always signal bad actors, or just bad actors. Bad situations can 
also be the source of trouble. CTs, by their very nature, emerge in situations of inaccessible, 
incomplete, and ambiguous information. This is especially so when the OS is backed by 
institutions whose actors are unable or unwilling to engage CT proponents and when there are 
important asymmetries in power, expertise, or informational resources. For much of the public, 
even topics like climate change, electronic voting, the 9/11 attacks, or vaccines and autism fit 
this kind of situation. Inquiring minds want to know—but most have no ability to make a 
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remotely informed judgment based on information independent of the institutional authors of the 
OS. As an audience, all they have available are the kind of heuristics that Oswald has in mind 
when he cites Jackson’s (1996) “failed diagnostic strategies.” And CT advocates who are not 
institutional members are in just as difficult a position. They can’t do research on the relation 
between autism and vaccination. They don’t have access to the computer programs that stored 
the Ohio votes in the 2004 Presidential election (Fitrakis, Rosenfeld, & Wasserman, 2006). They 
can’t examine Obama’s birth certificate unless Obama and the state of Hawaii release the long 
form. Often, the best they can do is examine the available evidence, point out errant data and 
gaps and inconsistencies in the OS, ask questions, propose analogies to other cases of cover-up, 
make ad ignorantiam arguments, and raise ad hominem attacks that open the OS to suspicion. 
All these strategies, while weak as far as demonstrating a counter-theory to the OS, can be 




The point here is this: In these kinds of circumstances it is natural to expect legitimately 
frustrated CT advocates to sound much like illegitimate CT wackos, to expect that the public to 
be unequipped to tell the difference so that at least some find the CT rhetoric persuasive, and to 
expect that the situation to be deliberately exploited by those special interests with the resources 
to out and out manufacture doubt about the OS and to fabricate the appearance of telling 
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